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Migration Policy and Radicalization of Russian Federation as Potential Threat to Regional Security

Summary. In the migration policy of the Russian Federation, issues such as the problem of refugees, resettlement, statelessness, the need to adjust the state's asylum policy and preparing infrastructure for refugee groups are essential. Repatriation projects are also related to the concept of the Russian Federation in the field of migration policy in accordance with the level of authority of compatriots living abroad. Moreover, for the needs of economic, political and ideological reintegration projects, Russia accepts all the former citizens of the USSR and their descendants as a Russian diaspora. This, in consequence, brings chaos in the process of determining the status of migrants and hinders the management of migration projects, in particular, the elements devoted to the animation of repatriation processes. This is where the migration policy of the Russian Federation loses its pragmatical character and, despite the advanced modernisation processes, is anachronistic and intensely politicised. The clash of views on the future of Russia is disguised under the facade of heated political debates over the prospects of immigration and migration policy. Proponents of immigration – liberals and pragmatists – focus on the long-term economic, demographic and political interests of the country. As the population of Russia decreases by 700,000 each year, immigration can play a vital role in balancing the shortage of the working-age Russians, maintaining the potential for economic development, supporting the stability of individual regions and guaranteeing national security. One of the ways to improve the population number of the Russian Federation could be to naturalise the representatives of Muslim communities. However, a large number of fighters are Muslims originating from the North Caucasus which is the source of the repeated negative discourse in Russia that has been developing since the nineties. Many Russians now associate the North Caucasus Muslim populations with extremism and terrorism. This perception is not entirely unjustified: the North Caucasus region has been plagued by war, terror and brutal state repression for over two decades.

Keywords: Russian Federation, migration policy, labour migration, radicalisation, FTFs, Foreign Terrorist Fighters, North Caucasus, terrorism, Returnees

1. Introduction. The importance of migration policy in the multi-ethnic country

Public administrators can follow three basic models for managing multi-ethnic populations: integration, differentialist or multicultural. All multi-ethnic nations can use public policy to manage the rights and needs of ethnic groups living there. What is more, stakeholders dispute whether cultural diversity creates economic costs or benefits. On the one hand, a richer knowledge base and experience can create organisational synergy leading to better results for everyone. At a macro level, diverse societal norms, customs, and ethics can nurture technological innovation, the diffusion of new ideas, and also the production of a greater variety of goods and services.

On the other hand, heterogeneous environments may produce coordination problems – for instance, when multiple languages are spoken – increasing transaction costs. Racial fragmentation can also adversely affect social cohesion and interpersonal trust and create irreconcilable divisions.

In Russian history, migrations were one of the main features that created social, political and economic processes. Constant expansion of Imperium was significant as ceaseless conquering new areas, which results by establishing a new multinational and multi-ethnic state. It also caused initiating complicated social processes and led to long-lasting economic, political and cultural consequences. The Russian Federation as a successor of Tsardom of Russia and USSR has arisen into the multi-ethnic, multinational, and multireligious country in an unbuilt way. During the settlement of the state, immigrants were bringing their cultural baggage, 'spiritual" otherness, a set of instruments allowing preserving the tradition and different lifestyle. That fact established multi-ethnic country, of which the population has never been a monolith since Russian multicultural politics has rather a nature of promoting folklore of particular ethnic groups than to launch actual socio-political mechanisms.

Immigration from Central Asia has always had an influence on the more industrialised Russian economy and in order to the unprofitable age structure of the population of the Russian Federation, became a necessity, without which the country would be threatened by demographic collapse and economic stagnancy. However, the scale of migration to the Russian Federation resulted in an ambivalent attitude towards that phenomenon among society.

The article aims to point out, that due to location, Russian migration policy is reactive in high range and serves us answer to assess the effectiveness of current solutions condition and changeable geopolitical context of the region. Migration flows become a global problem and forced Russia to join an international discourse concerning that subject. According to available data, migration

phenomenon undergoes revitalisation also in the Russian Federation – this country receives the second largest number of immigrants in the world. The purpose of the following analysis is to prove, that Russian migration policy has amended. National projects of its strict legislation show that this policy was deemed as an important determinant of future socio-economic order in the country. The article also introduces an influence of geopolitical challenges in the Russian migration policy – undoubtedly an additional stimulant to its modification was a migration crisis of South-East Europe.

For series of ethnopolitical and economic problems that Russia is struggling with, the migration could occur as a panacea, in condition that the phenomenon will be included in the set of instruments of social engineering processes (filling a demographic gaps in particular age group, re-inhabitation of deserted or poorly occupied areas, building infrastructural centres with the help of migrants). However, compensation of population shortfall should be implemented respectfully for migrants rights, their safety and protection to their development. Meanwhile, migration policy still mainly comprises the argument for the Russian Federation international policy and given Russian geopolitical situation and the nature of its political system the policy of maximum liberalisation the migration flows on this territory is not possible in the near future. Because of the Russian geographic location, its political influences in the post-Soviet area and plans of changing this country geopolitical situation, the subject of migration policy is continuously available in the internal and external Russian Federation policy. In the social discourse visible are expressions, that promote individual entity's fluency status of migration policy (economic migrants, refugees, forced migrants, displaced people, countrymen from abroad, immigrants from near abroad). The migration policy was and still is an instrument to the regional hegemony of the Russian Federation. It was clearly concluded by the president Vladimir Putin in an article *Russia: national matter*, which should be seen as the political program of the migration policy[1] and where country's migration strategy is explicitly linked to projects of reintegration Euro-Asian territory and a plan of strengthening the Russian geopolitical role in Southern Europe and the region of Central Asia.

2. The migration policy
of the Russian Federation after 1991

The Russian Federation inherited from the Tsardom of Russia and USSR not only complicated ethnopolitical structure but also a constant necessity of preparing

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[1] www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-23/1_national.html [accessed: 1.09.2016].

the country's structure to individual or group relocation, their reformation and project long-lasting solutions. Moreover, it very soon occurred, that apparatus (including low) developed by USSR is not enough to solve the current problems of the Russian Federation.

Creating the migration policy by Russia after 1991 was mainly focused on forming the legislative framework and developing institutional background. Actions mentioned above were strengthening the state's role in the process of creating and implementing the migration policy, thus diminishing the contribution of the public-private partnership's function. The critical legal act, which was obligated to organise that field of country's activity, was the 1993 constitution, where unfortunately definitive legislative framework of migration policy was not included. Competence to project and pursue that field of state''s activity was assigned to distinct tiers of government. Weaknesses of that solution were visible as a practice of overlapping between competences of different authorities and as caused by that, chaos in the area of migration policy.

Long-term managing of the migration chaos gave a possibility of constant competition between authorities, but it also brought a majority of the migration policy to the black economy which allows making a considerable profit. An additional difficulty is caused both by the fact of strong politicising the issue of migration, and their common objectification to the needs of current political infighting. The situation has changed since the president Vladimir Putin assumed office. During centralisation of power, central institutions took over part of regional government competencies (especially in financial aspect). Moreover, they reinforced control over realisation the migration policy on specific tiers. Beside legislative modifications, their beginning has conceptualisation, and realisation a number of federal and regional programs in the migration policy. Man of actions allowing systematisation and analysis of the migration phenomenon also were taken. Furthermore, there were formed databases with information about immigrants – likewise an intensive work on that subject taken by the Russian scientific community.

In 2002 two critical legal acts came into force: an act "the Russian Federation Legal Status of foreign citizens" from 25th July 2002, in which the list of limitations about treating migrants was extended and an act *Citizenship of Russia* from 31st May 2002[2]. In the same year, under the federal act from 12th June 2002 "On basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to participate in a referendum", the solution allowing foreign citizens to participate in the local elections was accepted[3]. a controversy was sparked

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[2] http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102076357 [accessed: 1.09.2016].
[3] http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102076507 [accessed: 1.09.2016].

by the federal act from 25th July 2002 "the Russian Federation Legal Status of foreign citizens", whereby state has a right to determine labour migrants' quota volumes, whose specific entities of state would be ready to receive, and then monitor their job careers. Institutions along with legal basis have not changed the negative way that society perceives immigration.

Table 1. Stages of the migration policy for the years 2001-2006

Stage I 2001-2002	Stage II 2003-2004	Stage III 2005- 2006	Stage IV since X 2006
The assessment of the migration policy effects in the 90s.	The beginning of liberalisation the migration policy.	The continuation of the liberalisation migration policy.	The inhibition of the migration policy.
Strengthening the requirements about renunciation of citizenship.	Simplifying the procedure of assignment citizenship.	Promoting the economic migration from the post-Soviet zone to Russia.	Strengthening penalties for infringements of the immigration provisions, modifications of quota system of migrant quota – new regulations in the field of giving passports to Russian citizens who live abroad.

Source: own elaboration.

The year 2006 brought tightening the migration policy. This change mainly derived from the geopolitical situation of the region. Arranged restrictions on economy migration were the Russian Federation's way to put pressure on the post-Soviet area, especially in the Central Asian states. These actions were the most valuable for countries with high unemployment. Expulsion of 3 million immigrants from the country brought certain consequences to the internal policy of other states. Deportation of illegal immigrants led to political destabilisation in their Fatherlands (it caused a revolution in Kyrgyzstan and overturned Kurmanbek Bakijew). The next stage in lowering the liberalisation process came from a deterioration of Russia-Georgia relations.

3. The assumptions of the Russian migration policy

The 2012-2025 assumptions of the Russian migration policy are derivatives from country's experiences and answers to current and forecasting labour market strength. The most valuable areas of the state's actions in this field are contained in Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period

to 2025[4]. That means a set of assumptions that order the migration policy, but its success is dependent on implementation and realisation processes.

Table 2. Project the realisation processes of the Russian migration policy

	Stage I 2012-2015	Stage II 2016-2020	Stage III 2021-2025
Main assumptions	Establishing migrants' accommodation centres. Providing health care. Developing new urban infrastructure for labour migrants. Developing infrastructure which promotes integration and adaptation of migrant workers (information centres, legal help centres, education centres with language, history and culture courses).	Auditing adopted regulations implementation. Intensificating information tools use to analyse and to solve a migration issue.	Evaluating the scope of implementation and effectiveness.
Planed effects after ending the stage	Establishing of infrastructure that promotes integration processes between immigrants.	Stalling the outflow of people from Siberia and the Russian Far East.	Changing the destiny of migrant people into regions of Siberia and the Russian Far East.

Source: own elaboration.

A key determinant of this concept is pragmatism – economic migrants are valuable for Russia to continue the development and that is why they will be accepted by the country, which is, nevertheless, not adequately prepared for this. Migration was qualified as a feature positively creating Russian labour market, which, however, should be appropriately adapted to economic and social challenges. There was also predicted a supportive set of facilitation and instruments for labour migrants, to which belong:
  – simplifying entry procedure,
  – simplifying administrative regulations connected to the legalisation of stay,
  – facilitating employment procedure, creation database with employee offer,
  – building accommodating and transport infrastructure,
  – facilitating access to health care,
  – ensuring equal access to education.

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[4] http://kremlin.ru/ acts/15635 [accessedp: 1.09.2016].

In 1991-2015 demographic sytuation was significantly changed on the post-
-Soviet zone. The number of population in Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and the
Baltic Sea region diminished. Russia also recorded a decline in population size,
what is more, effects of national pro-family policy should be noted as insufficient.
Due to that issue, migration flows were qualified as the capacity of valuable
compensatory, not only it was agreed to exploit the success of Azerbaijan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan but also it was determined to include
trends of new Russian migration policy into labour migrants' (from countries
above) capability. However, the quality of Central Asia migrants' social capital
appeared as challenging, what given the ethnically ageing Russian population and
the low birth rate is an essential problem. Creating a core of Asian immigrant
community young Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kirghiz are not able to operate Russian
language (it is a consequence of the process opposite to Russification in the 90s),
they are progressively worse educated (40% of them do not even complete
a professional education). An additional difficulty is caused by the fact of strong
politicising the issue of migration, its objectification the needs of current political
infighting. Many of those young immigrants in fields of culture and religion are
perceived by Russian as "foreign body".

Elaboration of main assumptions which create current and future Russian mi-
gration legislation was a response to the necessity of an increase in the economic
migration as well as a reaction to the growing number of refugees. Including:

– building positive reinforcements and incentives, which serve to the popu-
larisation of repatriation and settlement of labour migrants in Russian territory,

– aiming labour force optimisation due to the implementation of filters that
help in immigrants selection,

– building and using expected by state optimal internal migration outcomes,

– building conditions in order to maintain the population and its future
development in the south, east and Russian Federation border regions,

– projecting a coherent refugees policy (legislative background, programs,
infrastructure),

– fighting against illegal immigration and its criminalising.

New migration's political idea provides for constant observation the migration
flows. That concept would allow preparing projects about assumed migrants
relocation on a territory of Russia. In view of the strategic point, that position
is meaningful: a part of Russian regions is almost entirely depopulated, and
the number of people in Russian metropolises is continually increasing. These
disparities are conducted by elevators between migration movements. Their des-
tination is very often Moscow (30% of all migration flows) or other big cities
from Central Federal District, inhabited by 1/3 of Russian Federation population
(50% of migration flows). Mainly in that area migrants allocation enhances

territorial disproportion of productive forces apportionment, and also it causes strengthening of local labour market issues: long-lasting unemployment or deficit of employees in a particular sector or professions.

The fight with the specific structure of economic migration is an effect of implementation of new migration policy and resulted in ethnic work division. Labour immigrants monopolised the market of the worst paying jobs, and that represents one of the reasons why they are excluded from society. Building services sector and utilities are dominated by immigrants from Central Asia, transportation – Ukrainian and Belarussians and trading – Chinese. Encouragement from the Russian State is introduced to persuade people from Soviet Central Asia, like qualified workers, specialists, higher class representatives – persons with more interests in integration with Russian society. That would solve the problem of coexistence of parallel cities in Russian metropolis (at least partly), which are inhabited by isolated from society diaspora, who often live in poverty and tend their reluctance towards Russian culture. Infiltration of that environment is very straitened, even though it is commonly known that situations like bigamy[5], fictional marriages, illegal documents manufacturing industry which allow legalisation of stay, so-called temporary stays. That condition stimulates an increase in crime among immigrants – the number of general crimes committing by them, especially the number of murders and serious personal injury. Russia is also afraid of phenomena accompanying criminalisation the migration-development of terrorism on religious background, drug and human trafficking.

4. Radicalisation in the North Caucasus

Today there are more than 2,000 fighters from Russia on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq fighting on behalf of the Islamic State. Russian is estimated to be the second most common language spoken by all foreign ISIS militants.

A large number of these fighters are Muslims originating from the Northern Caucasus, a fact that feeds a narrative back in Russia that has been growing since the 1990s. Many Russians now link the Muslim populations of the North Caucasus with extremism and terrorism. That perception is not entirely unjustified: the North Caucasus region has been absorbed by war, terror, and brutal state crackdowns for over two decades. However, the story of the territory is as much about rapid social change as it is about the conflict. Russian state policies over the past two decades have done much to build today's pipeline of radicalised

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[5] Already married Central Asian citizens entering into a marriage with Russian women.

extremists originating from the North Caucasus to spread across Russia and beyond to the battle zones of the Middle East [Trier, Turashvili 2007: 34-55].

When the Soviet Union collapsed 25 years ago, the entire Muslim population of the south of the post-Soviet area continued to live in traditional rural communities. Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and other territories of the Northern Caucasus were among the last regions of Russia dedicated to urbanisation. The urbanisation processes, which often require generations, have been compressed for two short and violent decades there.

Interethnic conflict in 1992 in North Ossetia forced thousands of Ingush people out of their homes. The 1994 and 1999 wars in Chechnya displaced hundreds of thousands more people. If similar migration from rural to urban areas from the Volga, Transcaucasia and Central Asia, which are still part of the common economic space with Russia, is taken into account, this constitutes of millions of "new residents" who left rural areas of the former Soviet Union to large and small towns mainly to Russia [Lewis, Rowland 1977: 44-48].

The situation in Chechnya is particularly difficult. According to the 1989 census, there were 293,800 Russians in at that time combined Checheno-Ingushetia region. According to the 2002 census, only 40,600 Russians remained in Chechnya and 5,600 in Ingushetia. Some experts believe that even these figures are exaggerated for Chechnya. The outflow of Russians from Chechno-Ingushetia began during the times of the Soviet Union. Between 1979 and 1988, 70,000 people who left were mainly Russians. When the post-Soviet Chechen wars started, many Russians were killed by the separatist fighters; other Russians died in consequence of the Russian bombing. Russian refugees numbered in the hundreds of thousands. There are no definitive figures on the number of deaths and refugees.

These dislocated populations, severed from their homes and traditions, would often turn to their religion of Islam as a way to connect with their past, rebuild their identity and forge community. This growing Islamic renaissance gathered strength, both in the villages and among the communities that scattered in search of work.

Russian Muslims, economic migrants and traditional communities have witnessed how the Russian state response towards their Islamic awakening evolve into a political terror campaign. The fears and reactions of the Russian state (and society) to the revival of Islam, one of the four traditional religions in the Russian empire, created very radical concerns [Greene 1995: 56-62].

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Russian official sources promote the myth that all Muslims who have left Russia and other post-Soviet countries are extremists and terrorists. The reality

is complex and multilayered. Over the past 25 years, many Muslims left Russia to study in Turkey, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. Some chose to stay in those Muslim countries; others would like to return home, but they are afraid of persecution. Some Islamic activists are warned not to come back and are threatened with the view of arrest. The last two or three years have seen a sharp rise in the number of Islamic activists leaving for Turkey, Egypt, and Ukraine. This comes as a result of increased pressure from law enforcement agencies – not only in Russia but also in other post-Soviet countries with large Muslim populations. a large number of such political emigrants (from several hundred to several thousand) find themselves in Turkey. Many, if not most of these are people who have always been opposed to violence [Polian 2004: 21-29].

Another group of Muslims – several hundreds of people left to fight in Syria for the opposition forces, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamic fronts. They are members of the North Caucasus armed underground, affiliated with Caucasus Emirate declared by Dokka Umarov in 2007 as a regional branch of al-Qaeda. Most of them withdrew from fighting in 2014 when ISIS declared the establishment of a caliphate and demanded an oath from all the combatants. However, some stayed to fight on the side of Jabhat al-Nusra. They actively assist widows of fighters, who try to find their way out of areas that are under ISIS control or when they need financial support after leaving those areas successfully.

5. Foreign Terrorist Fighters –
as Returnees to Russia Territory

More than 42 000 foreign terrorist fighters have travelled to join Daesh from over 120 countries (between 2011-2016). More than 5 000 FTFs have departed from Europe. Many of these left from Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. However, the significant figure also left from Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The average percentage of FTFs returning to Europe is around 30 %, but the amount is higher for Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Nearly half of FTFs from these countries have returned.

One way to understand why individuals are motivated and recruited to join these groups is to look at the central themes of Daesh propaganda and the way it is constructed. Ingram argues that the building blocks of Daesh propaganda are born of three interrelated and interlinked themes: identity, crisis construct and solution construct. Accordingly, Daesh uses the interplay between value-, dichotomy- and crisis-reinforcing narratives to strengthen in-group and out-group identities, as well as the overall system of meaning. Specific themes are projected

throughout Daesh propaganda, according to Winner, such as mercy, belonging, brutality, victimhood, war and utopia. Others have identified themes such as military, governance, da'wa (propagation), hisbah (control of Sharia), promotion of the 'caliphate' and enemy attacks.

Foreign terrorist fighters are not newbies. Many conflict zones have attracted foreigners in the past, such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and so on. The blowback effect has also been evident in several terrorist atrocities, such as the 2005 London bombings, the perpetrators of which had received terrorist training abroad in Pakistan. What is unique about the current foreign fighter contingents in Syria and Iraq is the sheer volume of foreign fighters, which is unprecedented. Many of these European citizens, who travelled to Syria, Iraq and other conflict zones where terrorist groups rule, are now coming back. Many have already returned.

The term "foreign terrorist fighters" is to be found in United Nations Security Council resolution 2178, which defines them as "individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict"[6].

The Russians have waged a ruthless military campaign against a patchwork of Sunni militants from Ingushetia to Ossetia in the Caucasus. Moreover, while Russia's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy have been relatively effective in the short term, the draconian tactics employed by Russian forces could prove counterproductive in the long run, alienating substantial portions of the population and adding to significant grievances exploitable by Salafi jihadists. The most highlighted the following areas are:

– Russia's recent history with jihadist terrorism, dating back to the end of the Cold War and its incursions into Chechnya,

– Russian counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics and strategy in the Caucasus,

– third, the potential backlash from Russia's foray into Syria and its military campaign there,

– what the future might hold for Russia now that ISIS's caliphate has collapsed and potentially thousands of Russian and Russian-speaking foreign fighters could be leaving the battlefield in the Middle East, perhaps heading for new destinations, including Russia or countries on its borders.

The implications of Russia's fight against jihadist terrorism concern the United States, and therefore potential areas of cooperation.

FTF can be differentiated from mercenaries and employees of private (military or security) companies. States/governments usually recruit the latter, who join the

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[6] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2178, 2014, preamble para. 9.

warfare out of lucrative motives (though payment of salaries by ISIL (Da'esh) has been reported to be a financial incentive for some FTF)[7].

In reference to the potential recruits as to the seekers some literature refers to four primary types of FTFs:

– the Revenge Seeker (diffusely frustrated and angry and seeking an outlet to discharge that frustration and anger towards some person, group or entity whom he may see as being at fault),

– the Status Seeker (seeking recognition and esteem from others),

– the Identity Seeker (primarily driven by a need to belong and to be a part of something meaningful, and seeking to define their identities or sense of self through their group affiliations),

– the Thrill Seeker (attracted to the group because of the prospects for excitement, adventure, and glory) [Venhaus 2010: 8-11].

As the first step in tailoring responses to several groups of returnees, it might be beneficial to consider two generations, although a strict differentiation is not appropriate:

– the first generation of returnees, predominantly men, and motivated to leave for humanitarian reasons and/or to fight the Assad regime, was – with some notable exceptions – more prone to disillusionment, arguably less violent and relatively free to leave the terrorist-held territory – the current, second generation of returnees is more battle-hardened and ideologically committed, had to evade pervasive surveillance by Daesh to escape and may have come back with violent motives: to harm EU citizens.

It is also clear that women play an active role in disseminating Daesh propaganda on social media to attract more female recruits. Women in Syria have also made themselves available to others, who look for advice on things like how to carry out *hijra*, what to pack, how much money to bring, and so on. Female returnees often return to their home countries within the EU for one or a combination of several reasons: some are disillusioned after their experience of hardship and oppression, or after their husband was killed; others come back for medical treatment and family support. In a few examples, women have been bought free and rescued by their families. Some return due to family pressure [Trew 2016: 2-4].

There are also children returnees to consider. Since they were nine years old, some received military and ideological training. Returning children have experienced war trauma, witnessed executions and punishments and in some cases been forced to execute people. This was highlighted for instance by the Dutch intelligence agency AIVD in their publications: *Focus on Returnees* [Dutch

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[7] United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on foreign terrorist fighters*, S/2015/358, para. 29.

General Intelligence… 2017] and *Life With Daesh: The Myth Unravelled* [Dutch General Intelligence… 2016].

European citizens who travelled to Syria, Iraq and other conflict zones where terrorist groups have taken control, are now coming back. In recent months, Daesh has been under increasing military pressure in Syria and Iraq, causing the group to lose ground, leaders, manpower and supply routes. If the Daesh 'caliphate' is defeated militarily or collapses, the number of FTFs returning to Europe (especially from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) may arise. Although it is difficult to predict how the situation will evolve, most affected EU Member States expect a slow but gradual rise of returnees, rather than large numbers at the same time. These people will have different backgrounds, and a large section of the returnees will be women and children.

More than 42 000 Foreign Terrorist Fighters from 120+ countries joined terrorist organisations between 2011 and 2016, of which +/–5000 came from Europe. Departures peaked in 2015 and have decreased since then. Returners are of different nationalities, ethnicities, ages and genders. All have some level of trauma and emotional/psychological issues.

We can distinguish between different reasons and motives behind FTFs wanting to return:

1) the intention to carry out an attack (or feel they can do more for the cause in Europe than in Syria/Iraq),

2) disillusionment and remorse – some have had enough of the dire living conditions, others see no opportunity to remain (due to a loss of power from the terrorist group they belonged to),

3) family pressure and intervention,

4) health-care reasons (i.e. injuries or childbirth),

5) return after refuge in Turkey,

6) still driven by ideology, want better living conditions (opportunistic),

7) capture and extradition back to the EU [RAN 2016].

The motivational factors for individuals to join a terrorist group overseas are not unique. Some FTF belong to pre-existing kinship gangs for whom joining a terrorist group in Syria or Iraq is a shift to another form of deviant behaviour, transforming them from ordinary criminals into individuals seeing a political cause. Others are individuals without any criminal background who are unknown to law enforcement agencies. These tend to be relatively young people who may suffer from feelings of exclusion and an absence of belonging to their local communities or national societies. Notably, vulnerability, frustration, perceptions of inequity and a feeling that by joining the fight in Syria they have nothing to lose and everything to gain, are common traits among both groups.

Across Europe, the majority of FTFs are men (80%). While women constitute on average of 20%, there are regional variations, for example, the proportion of women is lower in Italy and Spain (10%). For a number of reasons, it is important to take into account gender differences due to preventive interventions. Motivations for joining jihadist groups must be understood to tailor responses to FTF returnees. For men, there is a strong focus on masculinity, life as a warrior and the glorification of martyrdom – a sub-culture of jihadi cool fuses sensation-seeking youths with popular culture, propaganda and films. Maintaining honour is reproduced through war and martyrdom. Researcher Evin Ismail has termed this "live fast die young masculinity" within Da'esh. Often, young male recruits have a criminal background and asocial psychological disorders which means they have a range of difficulties, such as low impulse control, anger management issues, a propensity for violence as a tool for power and control, metaphorical short-sightedness and so on. Trauma from having inflicted, experienced or witnessed violence must be addressed [RAN Manual 2017: 83].

FTF returnees make their way back to Europe along with several routes:

– some request consular support, especially if they require new passports or assistance with children born in Syria or Iraq; some travel on false ID documents,

– some make it back via detours through other European destinations; some travel back directly through Russia and Turkey,

– some that are captured by the Turkish or Iraqi authorities, or by the Kurdish forces.

Over the past seven years, jihadist activism has proliferated across multiple areas, joined by an unprecedented number of individuals who have become foreign fighters. Much of the focus has understandably been on foreign fighter flows to Syria. However, Russia has also seen a significant influx.

After fighters streamed from Russia to Syria in 2012-2013, the trajectory reversed itself in spring 2014, aimed at bolstering the Islamic State's attempt to establish a base in Syria. This reverse flow, as noted, included Russians who had trained and fought with IS in Iraq and Syria, but also a cadre of foreign fighters. Such forces would establish relations with some ASL figures who would eventually defect, helping Islamic State quickly build its infrastructure in Russia, in part by exploiting jihadist resources [Youssef 2013: 2-4].

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Polityka migracyjna i radykalizacja Federacji Rosyjskiej jako potencjalne zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa regionalnego

Streszczenie. W polityce migracyjnej Federacji Rosyjskiej istotne miejsce zajmują takie aspekty, jak problem uchodźców, przesiedleń, bezpaństwowości, konieczności dostosowania polityki azylowej państwa i przygotowania infrastruktury dla grup uchodźców. Projekty dotyczące repatriacji są również związane z koncepcją Federacji Rosyjskiej w zakresie polityki migracyjnej, stosownie do znaczenia rodaków mieszkających za granicą. Co więcej, dla potrzeb ekonomicznych, politycznych i ideologicznych projektów reintegracyjnych Rosja akceptuje wszystkich byłych obywateli ZSRR i ich potomków jako rosyjską diasporę. To w konsekwencji wprowadza chaos w proces ustalania statusu migrantów i utrudnia zarządzanie projektami migracyjnymi, w szczególności elementami poświęconymi animacji procesów repatriacji. Stanowi to punkt, w którym polityka migracyjna Federacji Rosyjskiej traci swój pragmatyczny charakter i pomimo rozwiniętych procesów modernizacyjnych jest wyraźnie anachroniczna i intensywnie upolityczniona. Fasada gorących debat politycznych nad perspektywami polityki imigracyjnej i migracyjnej ukrywa zderzenie poglądów na temat przyszłości Rosji. Zwolennicy imigracji – liberałowie i pragmatyści – mają na uwadze długoterminowe gospodarcze, demograficzne i polityczne interesy kraju. Ponieważ liczba ludności Rosji zmniejsza się co roku o 700 000 osób, imigracja może odegrać istotną rolę w równoważeniu niedoboru Rosjan w wieku produkcyjnym, utrzymując potencjał rozwoju gospodarczego, wspierając stabilność poszczególnych regionów i zagwarantowanie bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Jedną z opcji, mającą na celu poprawienie stanu osobowego Federacji Rosyjskiej, mogłoby być naturalizowanie przedstawicieli środowisk muzułmańskich. Jednakże duża liczba bojowników to muzułmanie pochodzący z Północnego Kaukazu, co jest źródłem powrotu negatywnej narracji w Rosji, która rozwija się od lat 90. XX w. Wielu Rosjan łączy teraz populacje muzułmańskie Północnego Kaukazu z ekstremizmem i terroryzmem. Ta percepcja nie jest całkowicie pozbawiona podstaw: region Północnego Kaukazu został ogarnięty przez wojnę, terror i brutalne represje państwowe od ponad dwóch dekad.

Słowa kluczowe: Federacja Rosyjska, polityka migracyjna, migracja zarobkowa, radykalizacja, FTF, zagraniczni bojownicy/terroryści, Kaukaz Północny, terroryzm, powracający